The outcome of presidential elections in Chile presents an extremely polarized picture in which the left, which came to power on the back of social movements, finds itself competing with an extreme right that uses various arguments taken from Trump’s agenda. What is the cause of this polarization, and why have populist political movements and those we might call social-democrats generated such strong reactions that they have led to the growth (or return) of radical right-wing parties, some of which are nostalgic for the past military juntas? What kind of polarization has occurred in individual countries? These, in a nutshell, are the questions that Santiago Anria, political scientist from Cornell University, tried to answer in his talk during the first day of the “Protesting Crises: Progressive Social movements in the Face of Authoritarian Backlash” international conference. Anria’s speech is not a commentary on the Chilean elections and comes well before them, but the political scientist’s analysis helps to understand what is happening in that country as well.

Anria presented two different trajectories from different country case studies that represent different polarization trajectories, the populist (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador) and the socialdemocratic (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay), with Argentina in between. In this post we briefly summarize professor Anria talk and ask him a few questions.

In Anria’s reading, in highly socially segmented societies, polarization can be a positive scenario that can “enhance democratic accountability by forcing parties to stake out meaningfully different positions on salient issues, respond to the interests of different types of voters, and develop name-brand  loyalties among citizens who care deeply about major policy issues”. The negative side is when governments use the political “enemy” to bend institutions to their interests, deny the democratic legitimacy of other actors and can   “paralyze  democratic institutions or, worse yet, threaten their very survival when political antagonists cease  to process their differences by mutually recognized democratic means” (Anria S., Roberts K. M., Polarization and Democracy: Latin America After the Left Turn, Cornell, 2025).

Comparing the Populist and Social Democratic Lefts

The scheme presented by professor Anria, as he reminded, does not show the many differences even in the two groups, in all these countries the left was pluralistic with different currents fighting for preponderance. Also, all political forces promised to deepen democracy, make it more participatory but in practice they really struggled to manage this idea.

Each country has a different path, in Brazil and Chile the parties that were seeking to transform the system were transformed by it because of a “conformist temptation” or a technocratic logic facing backlash both on their left flank (social movements) and from the populist radical right. In the populists cases the will to reform institutions unilaterally, the crucial role of charismatic leaders that made succession very difficult, made the populist left vulnerable. In every case we have witnessed a right-wing backlash, in some cases with autocratic tendencies.  In Chile and Brazil the focus was also on cultural issues: religion, gender, race, etc).

Few questions for professor Anria

What, in your opinion, determines the choices you define as “conformist” and “autocratic temptation”?

Although there is a political explanation for the different trajectories of the Latin American left, the behavior in power by different leftist forces was shaped by their historic experiences and institutional environments. This is to say that neither the social democratic left chose to be conformist, nor the populist left chose to be autocratic. But each had different formative experiences, which shaped their very understanding of democracy, and these ideas were reinforced and reproduced by the institutional contexts in which they accessed power during Latin America’s left turn. And these ultimately contributed to the types of vulnerabilities they were prone to.

Can we have some examples on how polarization takes shape in different contexts?

Here some contextualization might be important. Everyone knew from the beginning of the left turn that left turns in populist cases of Venezuela and Bolivia were polarizing, as polarization is intrinsic to populism’s construction of the political field; it is one of its defining properties. But that was decidedly not the case for the social democratic lefts in Brazil and Chile, which set out explicitly to avoid the polarizing ideological battles and class conflicts that had undermined their democratic regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. The parties leading the left turn in the latter two cases made explicit efforts to moderate their platforms and build broad, multi-party governing coalitions in order to contain polarizing effects. What’s interesting, I think is that polarization intensified in both sets of cases—a point that calls into question the distinction between populist and social democratic lefts. The other interesting thing, I’d add, is that it’s crucial to distinguish “ideological” from “institutional” polarization. The former (ideological distance between major players) has intensified everywhere, whereas the latter (confrontation among rivals over the basic rules of the game) was arguably more acute in the left populist cases, where parties or movements used their powers to rewrite the rules of the game, sometimes without the consent or collaboration of other actors to do so).

What was right reaction both in social-democratic and in populist contexts?

I think it’s interesting that the right strengthened across the board. Conservative backlashes surely emerged as a byproduct of progressive movements and parties to reduce social and economic inequalities, even in cases that experienced very moderate and institutionalized left turns where social democratic parties made explicit efforts to build broad coalitions, moderate their programs, and dampen polarizing tendencies. Think about the moderation of the PT in Brazil. Efforts to contain polarization could have undercut fears on the right on the threatening nature of the left—but they did not. This experience demonstrates that a radical, highly polarized left is not a precondition for the emergence of a radical right—even relatively modest forms of social inclusion in favor of those “at the bottom” generate virulent opposition from far-right quarters.

Is there a link only with political history or also with society and the economy? Let me explain: is Lula’s conformist choice also the result of the need to govern such a complex and large country? Are the ‘Bolivarian’ choices not in some way damaged by the presence of rich subsoil that allows aggressive use of public spending (more radical policies) without having to think too much?

Yes, sure—the left faced enormous structural constraints, and you can think of their trajectories as conditioned by structural and political factors. The account I provided—which is based on my forthcoming book with Ken Roberts—offers a political explanation but doesn’t claim that all observed variations can be explained by political factors alone. Think about Uruguay, for example, which may help address both your questions—it was able to achieve significant progress in social inclusion, avoid the worst pitfalls of the conformist temptation, and contain polarization dynamics. That Uruguay did so can be at least partially explained by the fact that it combined legislative majorities with strong connections to labor and social movements. But not only that. Redistributive pressures were also less acute in the country, given its strong welfare state, lower levels of inequality, and stronger provision of public services.